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SALT TWO
SESSION I
A- 105

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DATE: December 18, 1972
TIME: 12:00 noon - 12:30 p.m.
PLACE: Soviet Mission, Geneva

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

Mr. Paul H. Nitze Academician A. N. Shchukin
Dr. Harold Brown

Shchukin said that he was afraid today's statements on FBS would have a bad effect on his authorities in Moscow. Nitze pointed out that originally the US had merely referred to our earlier statements at Vienna and Helsinki and had said that our current position was unchanged. Our statement of today was in response to Soviet challenges asserting that conditions had changed and that references to past statements were unconvincing. He added that, in his view, the U. S. presentation today was the more reasoned one. Shchukin said he understood Nitze's view that the U. S. statement was more logical, and could even agree with it, but that nevertheless there was a strong political connotation to these matters and he thought the effect would not be helpful to our negotiations.

Nitze went on to note that the May 26, 1972, Nixon-Brezhnev "Statement of Principles," read as a whole, indicated that agreements between the USSR and the U. S. would not affect the alliances of either country, and Shchukin indicated that this was also his reading.

Brown said that he had discussed with others of his Delegation, including Ambassador Smith and Mr. Nitze, the points that Shchukin had made at our last meeting of Delegates, and subsequently in private

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conversations about MIRV and about the possibilities of restraint. Brown himself had been thinking more about these questions. Though he had no solutions, he was prepared to list a sort of alphabet of the problem, which each side might consider (and might want to add to) to see whether the problem could be solved by selecting some systems for further limitation or for restraint. For each system, there was a question of not developing it, not testing it, and/or not deploying it. Brown listed in two columns, one labeled USA and one labeled USSR, two lists of identical items, as follows: MIRV and MaRV (mentioning that MRV could also be subsumed under these headings); SLCM; ALBM; bombers (platforms). He noted that on SLCMs, for example, the Soviets had tested and deployed them, the U. S. had done neither; just the reverse of the MIRV situation.

Shchukin said that he continued to view this approach and discussion as very useful. He did not know whether it would be possible to reach a solution of the MIRV problem but thought that we should keep trying. He would want to think about Brown's list. He did not know how far his authorities would want to pursue the question (Brown and Nitze said that they were in a similar position).

Shchukin then proceeded to ask whether the U. S. had plans to deploy an ALBM. Brown said that in the sense of a long-range missile of that sort, as opposed to the short-range SRAM, the U. S. had no present plans for development nor deployment. Shchukin asked about SLCM and Nitze said there were U. S. plans to develop an SLCM, but no deployment plans. Shchukin asked about long-range cruise missiles to be launched from aircraft. Brown said that there was a development and deployment plan instituted when he had been Secretary of the Air Force for missiles of this sort of moderate range, but that these were intended as penetration aids for the bombers to saturate a defense consisting of airborne radar with tracking capability and of long-range supersonic interceptors. The purpose of such air-launched cruise missiles was to saturate such defenses, not to be a separate deterrent force.

Nitze asked why Shchukin had listed MaRVs with MIRVs; as we saw them they were additional insurance to penetrate surface-to-air missiles defenses (which on one side were as high as 10,000

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launchers) in case the latter had some ABM capability. Shchukin said they were concerned about MaRVs which might go low, rise again, and then descend to their target. Shchukin said, on their side, they referred to them as "American mountain ranges."

Nitze raised the question of why Soviet requirements for strategic forces usable against third countries were offered by Shchukin as an argument against throw-weight limitation or reductions since the Soviets could reach third countries with MR/IRBMs which were not included in these limitations. Shchukin said this kind of question needed to be discussed but did not give an answer to Nitze's specific point.

Shchukin said he would think further about the list of weapon systems that we had discussed, and wanted to be sure that he had not forgotten any. Brown gave him a duplicate of the list given above.

HB PHN
SALDEL:HBrown:PHNitze:mb:ar

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